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Apparently, the factors favoring the intermediate approach were either
summarily dismissed or never considered at all.
The danger of applying the majority rule arbitrarily to situations
when subrogation is present is that unless the insured and the insurer
cooperate, there will be a race to the courthouse, and the loser will be
denied his day in court.8
LEONARD C. GREENEBAUMf
REID v. COVERT DISTINGUISHED IN DISTRICT COURT
In 15 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 79 (1958), this writer commented on
Reid v. Covert,1 in which the Supreme Court declared article 2(11) of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice2 to be unconstitutional as ap-
plied to civilian dependents accompanying servicemen overseas in time
of peace. Recently, in United States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy,3
a lower federal court was called upon to construe the same article of the
Uniform Code. This time, however, civilian employees is the group
within article 2(11) to be scrutinized.
Dominic Guagliardo, a civilian employee of the Air Force at
Nauasseur Air Depot, Morocco, was convicted of larceny by a general
court-martial at the Air Depot and confined at hard labor. Issue was
joined in the District Court of the District of Columbia before Judge
Holtzoff on a petition by Guagliardo for a writ of habeas corpus.
The position of civilian dependents being tried by court-martial,
as illustrated by Reid v. Covert, is perhaps closer to that of civilian em-
"Cf. Levitt v. Simco Sales Service, 135 A.2d gio (Del. 1957), a case of first im-
pression which recognizes this possibility but rejects it. Significantly, the Delaware
court relies on Mills v. DeWees as controlling. Moreover, its reasons for adopting
the strict majority rule are fundamentally practical ones-i.e., infrequent injustice,
public policy against multiplicity of suits, and crowded dockets. For an analysis
of these practical considerations, see Note, 14 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 114 (1957).
It is submitted that the Levitt case dramatically points up the possibility of a race
to the court house. There, the insured was sued for damages to the plaintiff's truck.
Levitt, the defendant, was defended by his insurance carrier in his name, and a
counterclaim was imposed by the insurance carrier for damage to Levitt's automo-
bile. Verdict was for the automobile owner, Levitt, on the complaint and for the
truck owner on the counterclaim. As a result, Levitt, ironically, was barred from pur-
suing an action for personal injuries. Could it not be said he lost the race to the
court house?
1354 U.S. i (1957), reversing 351 U.S. 470 (1956).
64 Stat. 1o9 (1950), io U.S.C. § 8o2 (Supp. V, 1952).
8158 F. Supp. 171 (D. D.C. 1958). [Ed. Note: After this note was written, case
was reversed on appeal. 27 U.S.L. Week 2117 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 12, 1958).
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ployees, illustrated by the case in comment, than Judge Holtzoff would
lead one to believe. This is illustrated graphically as follows:
Operative Facts Reid v. Covert Guagliardo v. McElroy
person civilian dependent civilian employee
relation to service4  accompanying employed
offense charged murder larceny
place overseas overseas
time peace time peace time
The principal case recognizes that the holding in Covert is limited to
capital cases involving civilian dependents accompanying servicemen
overseas.5 The opinion in Guagliardo could have been limited to
courts-martial of civilian employees for crimes less than capital but in-
stead stated unqualifiedly that civilian employees may be tried by
courts-martial. This is dictum. The holding of the case is necessarily
limited to the facts presented, and since the crime involved is less than
capital, the case can be cited for this only.
It is felt that Justice Frankfurter would concur in the result reached
in the principal case although only to the extent that it involved a
non-capital case.6 Justice Harlan would certainly go at least this far.7
As for Justice Black, on the other hand, it is doubtful whether he would
consent to any such extension of military authority over civilians.
Justice Black does not distinguish between capital and non-capital
crimes, nor between times of peace and war, but boldly states that
"military trial of civilians is inconsistent with both the 'letter and spirit
of the constitution.' "s He does state in the Convert opinion that "We
'Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 109 (1950), 10 U.S.C. § 802 (Supp. V.,
1952):
"The following persons are subject to this chapter:
"(i ) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be
a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving with, employed
by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States...."
5Judge Holtzoff states that "the only point on which a majority of the Justices
concurred is that in a capital case a civilian dependent of a member of the armed
forces may not be tried by court martial. Six Justices joined in that view." 158 F.
Supp. at 175 (D. D.C. 1957). Technecially, the further limitation in time of peace
must be included in the holding of the majority of Justices. See Note, 15 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 79 (1958).
0Justice Frankfurter adheres to the rule "never to formulate a rule of constitu-
tional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied."
354 U.S. at 45 (concurring opinion).
7Justice Harlan states that in regard to requiring a full article III trial for
dependents "at least for the run-of-the-mill offenses ... such a requirement would
be ... impractical...." Id. at 75 (concurring opinion).
8id. at 22.
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recognize that there might be circumstances where a person could be
'in' the armed services for purposes of Clause 14 even thoguh he had not
formally been inducted into the military or did not wear a uniform."0
This passage was quoted by Judge Holtzoff and cited for the proposi-
tion that members of the Supreme Court recognize a distinction be-
tween dependents of servicemen and civilian employees of the armed
forces. 10 This seems to be a very dubious citation.
The significance of the above-quoted statement in the thinking
of Justice Back on the subject of courts-martial of civilians is not dear.
It is believed, however, that a person must be much more closely re-
lated to the military than just being a civilian employee for Justice
Black to say he had lost his civilian status and his right to a civilian
trial.". The "might" in Justice Black's quotation, it is submitted, was
intended to be a large one.
Even though the decision in the principal case might not find favor
with Justice Black, it is believed that the case is correctly decided and,
in view of the reasoning of the concurring Justices in Covert, would be
affirmed by a majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court should that
Court review it. Civilian employees seem clearly to be "close enough"' 2
to the land and naval forces, even in the light of the safeguards of the
Bill of Rights so that their regulation is reasonably necessary and
proper to the effective government and regulation of the armed forces.
DONALD J. CURRIE
9Ibid.
"158 F. Supp. at 175.
uFrom the language used by Justice Black in the Covert case, it can be seen
that there is contemplated by this Justice a great dividing line between military
personnel and civilians. The following are illustrations: "But if the language of
Clause 14 is given its natural meaning, the power granted does not extend to
civilians...." 354 U.S. at i9; "But the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot operate
to extend military jurisdiction to any group of persons beyond that class described
in Clause 14 . " Id. at 2o; "We have no difficulty in saying that such persons
[dependents] do not lose their civilian status and their right to a civilian trial be-
cause the Government helps them live as members of a soldier's family." Id. at 23.
,See Note, 15 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 79 (1958), where 'the resolution of this "close
enough" test is described as the crux of the split in the court.
